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Antirealists who hold the knowability thesis, namely that all truths are
knowable, have been put on the defensive by the Church-Fitch paradox of
knowability. Rejecting the non-factivity of the concept of knowability used
in that paradox, Edgington has adopted a factive notion of knowability, ac-
cording to which only actual truths are knowable. She has used this new
notion to reformulate the knowability thesis. The result has been argued to
be immune against the Church-Fitch paradox, but it has encountered several
other triviality objections. Schlöder in a forthcoming paper defends the gen-
eral approach taken by Edgington, but amends it to save it in turn from the
triviality objections. In this paper I will argue, first, that Schlöder’s justifica-
tion for the factivity of his version of the concept of knowability is vulnerable
to criticism, but I will also offer an improved justification that is in the same
spirit as his. To the extent that some philosophers are right about our intuitive
concept of knowability being a factive one, it is important to explore factive
concepts of knowability that are made formally precise. I will subsequently
argue that Schlöder’s version of the knowability thesis overgenerates knowl-
edge or, in other words, it leads to attributions of knowledge where there is
ignorance. This fits a general pattern for the research programme initiated by
Edgington. This paper also contains preliminary investigations into the inter-
nal and logical structure of lines of inquiries, which raise interesting research
questions.
1 Introduction
Antirealists, including idealists, verificationists and intuitionists, are of the view
that all truths are knowable (Hart and McGinn, 1976; Hart, 1979; Dummett, 1991;
Tennant, 1997). Call this the knowability thesis. The latter has been challenged by
the so-called Church-Fitch paradox of knowability (Fitch, 1963), which starts from
the aforementioned view and leads to the claim that all truths are known, which is
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utterly implausible. It has been questioned whether the concept of knowability
that is used in the Church-Fitch paradox is a good one, since it is non-factive (i.e.
knowable falsehoods are possible). It has been argued that our intuitive concept of
knowability is factive (Brogaard and Salerno, 2006; Fuhrmann, 2014) or, in other
words, that only truths are knowable. Moreover, Kvanvig (1995) has pointed out
that, given that antirealists want to define truth as knowability, they can only ac-
cept a factive notion of knowability. In response, Edgington (1985), Fara (2010),
Fuhrmann (2014) and Spencer (2017) have tried to defuse the Church-Fitch para-
dox by making use of a factive concept of knowability.1 In what follows, I will
focus on (Edgington, 1985).
In its simplest version, the idea of Edgington (1985) is that the antirealist thesis
should be understood as the view that all actual truths are possibly known to be
actually true. In symbols:
AK Aφ→ ^KAφ,
with A the actuality operator, ^ the possibility operator and K the knowledge oper-
ator. The standard truth condition for possiblity sentences is the following (Kripke,
1963): sentence ^φ is true at world w just in case φ is true at at least one world
that is modally accessible from w. The modal accessibility relation is a binary re-
lation on the worlds. The standard truth condition for knowledge sentences is the
following (Hintikka, 1962): sentence Kφ is true at world w just in case φ is true at
all worlds that are epistemically accessible from w. The epistemic accessibility re-
lation is a reflexive binary relation on the worlds. The standard truth condition for
actuality sentences is the following (Kaplan, 1989): sentence Aφ is true at world w
if and only if φ is true at the actual world, w0.
If one operates with the standard semantical truth conditions for those opera-
tors, then one can derive the disastrous conclusion that Aφ→ KAφ (Rabinowicz
and Segerberg, 1994). Schlöder (2019) calls this the simple triviality argument.
There is a technical solution for this problem: make use of a particular kind of two-
dimensional semantics (Rabinowicz and Segerberg, 1994). Heylen (2020) argues
that, even with this solution, there is another trivialisation issue lurking around the
corner. One can derive in two-dimensional semantics from the hypothetical validity
of AK and via the frame condition for AK that possibly every actual truth is known
to be actually true. In other words, a consequence of Edgington’s knowability the-
sis is the possible omniscience of actual truths. He argues that this consequence is
very implausible as well. Consider, for instance, all the actual truths about all the
real distances between all atoms in the universe. It follows from Edgington’s thesis
that all those are known in a single possible world.
Williamson (1987) raises another worry, namely: how can one have knowledge
in a non-actual world about the actual world? After all, there is no causal contact
1Relatedly, Artemov and Protopopescu (2013) and Fischer (2013) have argued not for making
knowability factive but for restricting the knowability thesis to certain classes of truths, namely so-
called ‘stable’ and ‘uniform’ truths, respectively.
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between worlds. Given that non-actual de re knowledge about the actual world is
hard to make sense of, a natural suggestion is that knowledge in a non-actual world
about the actual world is possible if the epistemic agents in that non-actual world
have a description of the actual situation (i.e. an incomplete but correct description
of the actual world). With α a description of the actual situation and with φ a
sentence, Williamson considers two cases: one in which α materially implies φ
and one in which α counterfactually implies φ. Let us discuss these in turn.
Taking up the first suggestion, one can reformulate AK to get the following
(Schlöder, 2019):
αK Aφ→ ^K (α→ φ).
Williamson points out that, if α includes φ as a conjunct, then the knowability of
φ in the form of ^K (α→ φ) amounts to the knowability of a trivial logical truth
((α∧φ)→ φ). Here is another way to show that triviality lurks around the corner.
Knowability is necessarily factive: if α is a description of the actual world and if
^K (α→ φ), then φ (is true in the actual world). In other words, it is a truth that
 (^K (α→ φ)→ (α→ φ)) .
Given modal axiom scheme K, one can then derive that:
^K (α→ φ)→  (α→ φ) .
Given modal axiom scheme 5, one can subsequently infer that:
^K (α→ φ)→  (α→ φ) .
So, if the knowability of φ based on the description α is necessarily factive, then
α strictly implies that φ.2 Note that, if the ^ operator in αK is interpreted in a
very weak sense (e.g., as a logical possibility operator), then the  operator has
to be interpreted in a corresponding very strong sense (i.c., as a logical necessity
operator). Of course, it makes sense to interpret the ^ operator in αK in a very
weak sense, because it makes it harder to come up with counterexamples.
Taking up the second suggestion, we get the following principle (Schlöder,
2019):
αK’ Aφ→ ^K (α φ),
with the counterfactual conditional operator. The standard truth condition for
counterfactual sentences is the following (Lewis, 1973): sentence φ ψ is true at
world w just in case all φ-worlds closest to w are ψ-worlds. Principle αK’ is more
than a theoretical option for a defender of AK to deal with the problem of non-
actual de re knowledge about the actual world, something along the lines of αK’
2One can show similarly that, if ^Kφ is supposed to be necessarily factive, then φ follows from
it.
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can be extracted from (Edgington, 1985). When discussing the application of AK
to examples Edgington (1985) has done two things. First, she uses a counterfactual
conditional instead of a material conditional: the knower in a possible situation
knows that, if α had happened, then φ would still be the case. Second, she has a
proposal for how to specify α: α is the negation of whatever has been done in that
possible situation to acquire knowledge that φ. A key example given by Edgington
(1985, p. 565) is the following:
A comet is returning shortly. The comet is in the process of break-
ing up, and this will be our last chance to observe it. A spacecraft is
being sent to investigate it and collect samples, in the hope of provid-
ing answers to certain questions, for example, does the comet contain
pre-biotic molecules? Suppose the true answer to this question is p;
and suppose, for simplicity, that if everything goes according to plan,
p will be known — either they will find them, or they will gather in-
formation which rules out there being any.
She continues by claiming that:
If [the mission succeeds and it is known that p], it will be known that,
had the mission failed, [. . . ] it would never have been known that p.
If we focus for now only on the replacement of the material conditional in αK by a
counterfactual conditional, then we end up with something in the vicinity of αK’.
However, αK’ is also subject to the same trivialisation issue. Williamson points
out that, if α includes φ as a conjunct, then the knowability of φ in the form of
^K (α φ) amounts to the knowability of a trivial logical truth ((α∧φ) φ).
Again, one can also show that triviality lurks around the corner by assuming that
knowability is necessarily factive: if α is a description of the actual world and if
^K (α φ), then φ (is true in the actual world). By the similar reasoning as above,
one can once again derive that  (α→ φ). Given modal axiom scheme 4, one can
next infer that  (α→ φ). In the Lewis-style semantics for counterfactuals, the
following is valid
 (φ→ ψ)→ (φ ψ) , (1)
and is its necessitation. Hence,  (α φ). Here it is also the case that, if the ^
operator in αK’ is interpreted in a very weak sense (e.g., as a logical possibility
operator), then the  operator has to be interpreted in a corresponding very strong
sense (i.c., as a logical necessity operator). Of course, it makes sense to interpret
the ^ operator in αK’ in a very weak sense, because it makes it harder to come up
with counterexamples.
Edgington (2010) has tried to argue that one can have knowledge about the
actual situation in a non-actual situation if the latter shares a causal history up to a
point of departure with the former. But Schlöder (2019) argues this move does not
solve the trivialisation issue either.
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To sum up, the antirealist thesis that all truths are knowable has been threatened
by the Church-Fitch paradox of knowability, which involves a non-factive concept
of knowability. Edgington has tried to save the thesis by reformulating it with the
help of a factive concept of knowability, but her version of the thesis is vulnerable
to other triviality issues.
In the next section I will give a brief exposition of the proposals made by
Schlöder (2019), who takes up Edgington’s αK’ and develops it to make it im-
mune against the triviality issues. A key concept employed by Schlöder is the
(un)successful pursuit of a line of inquiry. In Section 3 I will put into doubt the
justification that Schlöder offers for the factivity of his notion of knowability, but I
will also amend his justification to fix the problem. The problem and the fix take
into account the internal structure of lines of inquiries. In Section 4 and Section 5
I will argue that Schlöder’s reformulated antirealist thesis is open to the criticism
that it generates too much knowledge, which is due to the existence of alternative
lines of inquiries (satisfying certain conditions). In Section 6 I will briefly go into
the logical structure of lines of inquiries. It will be argued that, although appeal
to ‘disjunctive’ lines of inquiries are prima facie promising ways of getting around
the problem of the overgeneration of knowledge, in some cases this will not work
due to the problem of counterfactual de re ignorance about alternative lines of in-
quiry. Finally, in Section 7 I will summarize everything and I will also draw three
general conclusions about what is (not) fruitful to research.
The first general conclusion puts the problem of overgeneration of knowledge
for Schlöder’s knowability thesis in a wider perspective as part of a type of problem
faced by the entire research programme that was started by Edgington. The second
general conclusion emphasizes the relevance of factive notions of knowability, of
which there are few that are made formally precise and that are non-trivial. The
third general conclusion is that the preliminary investigation of the internal and
logical structure of lines of inquiries invites further research.
2 Schlöder on knowability and antirealism
Schlöder (2019) thinks that a further development of Edgington’s idea will lead to
a version of the knowability thesis that avoids the Church-Fitch paradox of knowa-
bility and also the triviality issues raised by Rabinowicz and Segerberg (1994),
Williamson (1987) and Heylen (2020). The guiding idea for reformulating the
knowability thesis is in Schlöder (2019, Section 2.3)’s own words the following:
(*) Given some actually true p, there is a course of inquiry i that is not successfully
pursued, but were it successfully pursued, would impart the knowledge that
had it not been (i.e. in actuality), p.
Schlöder (2019, Section 2.3) gives the following example to illustrate his guiding
idea:
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the procedure i to look at the ceiling which, if successfully pursued,
would impart the knowledge that hadn’t I looked, there (still) would
be a fly on the ceiling (Edgington, 1985).
The starting point for making this more precise is αK’. I will explain how to
incrementally proceed from the latter to Schlöder’s full proposal. Schlöder pro-
poses to the restrict counterfactual knowledge to those worlds in which a certain
counterfactual condition, β, obtains:
βαK’ Aφ→ (β K (α φ))
Next, one needs to determine what the β-condition is and what α is. Here Schlöder
will take his cue from the suggestive remarks made by Edgington on how to specify
α in her discussion of some examples. Let us use Inq for the set of all possible
courses of inquiry. Furthermore, if i ∈ Inq, let us use sp (i) to express that course
of inquiry i has been successfully pursued. Schlöder’s proposal is then that α and
β in βαK’ are the following:
• β : sp (i),
• α : ¬sp (i),
for at least one i ∈ Inq. Note, first, that α = ¬β. Second, in case φ is unknown in the
actual world, this implies that no course of inquiry has been successfully pursued.
Under that condition, α does indeed give an incomplete (yet correct) description of
the actual world. Third, note that the possibility operator  has been replaced by
sp (i) . . . . The counterfactual is true if there are no sp (i)-worlds, but then there
is a tension with the presupposition that i is a possible course of inquiry. So, the
truth of the counterfactual and the restriction of i to the possible courses of inquiry,
implies that there is at least one sp (i)-world. In effect, sp (i) . . . functions then
as a restricted possibility operator. The result of the proposed substitutions for α
and β in βαK’ is the following:
Aφ→∃i ∈ Inq (sp (i) K (¬sp (i) φ)) .
Let us focus for the moment on the consequent of the above. Maybe there is a
line of inquiry that has been successfully pursued or maybe there isn’t. For the
knowledge of ¬sp (i) φ to be about the actual world, the actual world needs to
be a world at which it is true that line of inquiry i was not successfully pursued.
So, the consequent of AK would have to be reformulated as follows:
∃i ∈ Inq (¬sp (i)∧ (sp (i) K (¬sp (i) φ)))
But of course, it might also be that a line of inquiry has been successfully pursued
at the actual world and that it results in knowledge. Therefore, the consequent of
AK has to be reformulated as follows:
Kφ∨∃i ∈ Inq (¬sp (i)∧ (sp (i) K (¬sp (i) φ)))
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Moreover, Schlöder does not only want the left-to-right direction but also the other
direction, because the antirealist thesis is that truth is equivalent to knowability.
So, one would get:
Aφ↔ (Kφ∨∃i ∈ Inq (¬sp (i)∧ sp (i) K (¬sp (i) φ))) .
Finally, Schlöder drops the actuality operator, so that one gets the following:
ART φ↔ (Kφ∨∃i ∈ Inq (¬sp (i)∧ (sp (i) K (¬sp (i) φ))))
The reasons for dropping the actuality operator are likely the following. First, the
right-hand-side of ART does not explicitly mention the actuality operator. Second,
one does not need the actuality operator for the right-to-left direction of ART, i.e.
it is not necessary for the factivity of knowability. Consider the first disjunct on the
right-hand-side of ART, Kφ. By the factivity of knowledge, it follows that φ. Next,
consider the second disjunct on the right-hand-side of ART. Schlöder appeals to
the following principle:
Symmetry For any formula φ and φ-world w and ¬φ-world w′, if w is the closest
φ-world to w′, then w′ is the closest ¬φ-world to w.
More generally, for any formula φ and φ-world w and ¬φ-world w′, if w is among
the closest φ-worlds to w′, then w′ is among the closest ¬φ-worlds to w. Now
consider a world w at which, for some i ∈ Inq, it is true that ¬sp (i) and that
sp (i) K (¬sp (i) φ). Let world v be among the closest-to-w worlds at which
sp (i) is true. Then K (¬sp (i) φ) is also true at v. By the reflexivity of the epis-
temic accessibility relation, it follows that ¬sp (i) φ is true at v. By symmetry
and by the assumption that v is among the closest-to-w worlds at which sp (i) is
true, it follows that w is among the closest-to-v worlds at which ¬sp (i) is true. By
the truth of ¬sp (i) φ at v, it follows then that φ is true at w. So, the truth of
the second disjunct of the right-hand-side of ART also entails φ. Therefore, in both
cases it follows that φ. In this reasoning we did not have to appeal to the semantics
of the actuality operator.
Importantly, Schlöder claims that ART avoids both Williamson’s and Heylen’s
triviality objections. Williamson’s triviality objection does not work against ART
for the following reason. As noted above, sp (i) functions as a restricted possibility
operator. It is not in general the case that all the worlds in a model are worlds at
which sp (i) is true. The right disjunct of the right-hand side of ART entails that
K (¬sp (i) φ) and, hence, ¬sp (i) φ is true relative to all the sp (i)-worlds that
are the closest-to-a-given world. This leaves open that there are other worlds in the
model at which ¬sp (i) and ¬φ are both true. Therefore, it is left open that there are
worlds at which ¬sp (i) φ is false and, hence,  (¬sp (i) φ) is false. Thus, it
can be that K (¬sp (i) φ) is possible in a restricted sense, while  (¬sp (i) φ)
is false. This crucially depends on ¬sp (i) and ¬φ being compossible.
The condition that a line of inquiry not being successfully pursued can coin-
cide with the falsity of a sentence that is a possible topic of inquiry is commonly
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satisfied. Let φ be expressing that there are cookies in the cupboard in the kitchen.
And let the line of inquiry be walking into the kitchen, opening the cupboard, and
looking into the cupboard and perhaps moving things around. Clearly, the line of
inquiry can be unsuccessful (maybe one of your children is crying and you go and
check on the child instead), while there are no cookies in the cupboard. Yet, some-
times the condition is not satisfied, notably if φ = ¬sp (i). In that case ¬sp (i) and
¬φ (= ¬¬sp (i)) are not compossible.
Schlöder’s solution is to force compossibility by adding an extra clause to ART,
namely
¬K (¬sp (i)→ φ) .
If ¬K (¬sp (i)→ φ) is true at a world w and if all worlds in W are modally acces-
sible, then it follows that there is a w′ ∈W such that ¬K (¬sp (i)→ φ) is true at w′,
whence it follows that there is an epistemically accessible world w′′ ∈W such that
¬sp (i) and ¬φ are true at w′′, which means that ¬sp (i) and ¬φ are compossible.
The reformulated antirealist thesis is then the following:
ART’
φ↔ (Kφ∨∃i ∈ Inq(¬sp (i)∧¬K (¬sp (i)→ φ)∧
(sp (i) K (¬sp (i) φ))))
This is then the final proposal in (Schlöder, 2019).
The antirealist thesis ART’ does not succumb to the problem of possible omni-
science (Heylen, 2020) either. There is an important preliminary point to be made
here, to wit, there are plausibly no “super” procedures that can impart knowledge
about everything. To repeat a previous example, given that there is actually a fly
on the ceiling, there is the procedure to look at the ceiling which, if successfully
pursued, would impart the knowledge that hadn’t I looked, there (still) would be
a fly on the ceiling. However, given that there is actually an ant on the floor, the
procedure to look at the ceiling will not impart knowledge that hadn’t I looked,
there (still) would be an ant on the floor. The more coarse-grained procedure to
look at something (in the room), whichever that is, can be successfully pursued
by, for instance, looking at the floor, without imparting knowledge that, if I hadn’t
looked at anything, there (still) would be a fly on the ceiling. We will have to make
do with multiple procedures that each can yield only limited knowledge.
There is no possible omniscience if and only if, for each of the courses of
inquiry, at the worlds closest to the actual world at which one of those courses
of inquiry has been successfully pursued, there is at least one sentence for which
it is not known, that had that course of inquiry not been successfully pursued, it
would (still) have been true. Let us say that w is the actual world and that w′
is among the closest-to-w worlds where line of inquiry i has been successfully
pursued. Furthermore, let’s say that φ is some sentence (that is actually true but
unknown). Then there has to a possible world, w′′, that is epistemically accessible
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from w and it has to be false at w′′ that, if i had not been successfully pursued, then
it would (still) be the case that φ. Therefore, there has to be is at least one world w′′′
that is among the closest-to-w′′ worlds at which i has not been successfully pursued
and that is distinct from the actual world w (for, otherwise, φ would have to be true
at w′′′). Then there is no formal restriction on making φ false at w′′′ (assuming that
¬sp (i) and φ are logically independent). Therefore, it is not a formal consequence
of ART’ that there is possible omniscience. To come back to the preliminary point,
i is the procedure to look at the ceiling, w is a world in which there is an ant on the
floor, whereas w′′′ is a world in which there is no ant on the floor.
A final remark is that the arguments for possible omniscience advanced by
Heylen (2020) all make use of properties of the frame conditions of knowability
theses such as Edgington (1985)’s AK. However, as Schlöder (2019, Section 2.3),
points out: his knowability thesis is formulated with the help of counterfactuals,
which do not have frame conditions. So, the argumentation strategy developed by
Heylen cannot get traction.
So, ART’ is safe from the issues pointed out by Williamson and Heylen. In the
next two sections I will discuss two new problems, each related to one direction of
his antirealist thesis. The right-to-left direction of that thesis says that only truths
are knowable in Schlöder’s sense, whereas the left-to-right direction of that thesis
says that all truths are knowable in Schlöder’s sense. The first problem pertains to
right-to-left direction of ART’ and is discussed in Section 3. The second problem
pertains to the left-to-right direction of ART’ and is discussed in Section 4 and
Section 5.
3 The factivity of knowability
It is important that Schlöder’s concept of knowability is factive or, in other words,
that the right-to-left direction of ART’ is true. As we have seen, the justification
for this depends on Symmetry. However, there are reasons to doubt Symmetry.3
Suppose that worlds correspond with the length of a particular person a. So, person
a is 180 cm tall in world w180, 179 cm tall in world w179 and 178 cm tall in world
w178 (perhaps due to malnutrition in that person’s childhood). Let φ express that
the length of a is at least 180 cm. Naturally, the closest-to-w178 world at which
φ is true is w180, because the difference in length of a in w178 on the one hand
and w180 on the other hand is the smallest for any of the φ-worlds. However, the
closest-to-w180 world at which φ is false is naturally w179, not w178, because the
difference in length of a in w180 on the one hand and w179 is the smallest for any
of the ¬φ-worlds. The Symmetry principle is confronted with a problem with
formulas that contain gradable predicates. Of course, Schlöder uses Symmetry
only for φ = sp (i), so the question is whether Symmetry restricted to those kind of
formulas is confronted with a similar problem. I will argue that it is.
3The following example was given by Lorenz Demey and roughly the same example was given
by an anonymous reviewer.
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Consider a line of inquiry that has only been successfully pursued if a number
of steps have consecutively been executed. A mundane example is to walk into the
kitchen, to open the cupboard, to looking into the cupboard, to move things around
and take them out of the cupboard, to look again. Even this homely example of a
multi-step line of inquiry can be used to produce a counterexample to Symmetry.
Cookies Suppose that in the actual world the line of inquiry was not successfully
pursued because something went amiss before even the first step could be
executed. Before you are walking into the kitchen, one of your children is
crying and you go and check on the child instead. Now consider a pos-
sible world w in which you have successfully pursued the line of inquiry.
Arguably, the worlds that are closest to w in which the line of inquiry has
not been successfully pursued do not include the actual world but rather the
worlds in which something went amiss before the line of inquiry could be
completed. For instance, consider a world in which you did walk into the
kitchen, you did open the cupboard, and you did look at the objects in front
of you, but you did not yet rummage through the cupboard to look at the ob-
jects hidden behind other objects, because in this world you hear the music
of an ice cream van and you decide to abort your search for cookies and buy
an ice cream instead.
Both the actual world and the world just described are worlds in which the line of
inquiry has not been successfully pursued. However, it is clear that in the latter
world, one has come closer to successfully pursuing the line of inquiry than in the
former, and hence, the latter world is closer to w than it is to the former. So, if lines
of inquiries are sometimes best conceived as step-by-step procedures, then one can
object to restricted Symmetry because the pursuit of lines of inquires can in those
cases be thought of as gradable.
Symmetry is problematic, but a tweak to Schlöder’s account of knowability
can guarantee factivity, even when we are acknowledging that lines of inquiries
can involve a sequence of steps that all need to be executed. First, let us add
vocabulary to express that successfully pursuing a line of inquiry is equivalent to
successfully executing a certain number of steps. The predicate se (i,n) expresses
that step n of line of inquiry i has been successfully executed. Then we have the
following:
∀i ∈ Inq∃n ∈ N>0 (sp (i)↔ se (i,n)) (2)
Second, let us encode the idea that successfully executing a step in a line of inquiry
is equivalent to successfully executing that step and all preceding steps.
∀i ∈ Inq∀n ∈ N>0 (se (i,n)↔∀m ∈ N>0 (m ≤ n→ se (i,m))) (3)
Combining (2) and (3) gives us the following equivalences:
∀i ∈ Inq∃n ∈ N>0 (sp (i)↔∀m ∈ N>0 (m ≤ n→ se (i,m))) (4)
∀i ∈ Inq∃n ∈ N>0 (¬sp (i)↔∃m ∈ N>0 (m ≤ n∧¬se (i,m))) (5)
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The above equivalences may suggest the following substitutions in the right dis-
junct of the right-hand side of ART or ART’:
• replace sp (i) everywhere by ∀m ∈ N>0 (m ≤ n→ se (i,m)) and
• replace ¬sp (i) everywhere by ∃m ∈ N>0 (m ≤ n∧¬se (i,m)),
with n the number of the last step that needs to be successfully executed for line
of inquiry i to be successfully pursued. Unfortunately, that would not allow us
to get factivity in a plausible way. Briefly, the reason is again that the worlds at
which the line of inquiry has not been successfully pursued and that are closest to
a world in which the line of inquiry has been successfully pursued are plausibly
those worlds at which the penultimate step of that line of inquiry has not been
successfully executed, whereas the actual world might be one at which an earlier
step was not successfully executed. However, what would work is replacing ¬sp (i)
everywhere by¬se (i,m) in the right disjunct of the right-hand-side of ART or ART’
and to give the restricted quantifier ∃m ∈N>0 : m ≤ n wide-scope. Here is the result
for ART:
∃i ∈ Inq∃n ∈ N>0∃m ∈ N>0(m ≤ n∧¬se (i,m)∧ (se (i,n) K (¬se (i,m) φ))
(6)
In addition, we need a more plausible symmetry principle. Here it is:
Symmetry-relative-to-steps For all i ∈ Inq, for all n ∈ N>0, for all m ≤ n ∈ N>0,
for any se (i,n)-world w and ¬se (i,m)-world w′, if w is among the closest
se (i,n)-worlds to w′, then w′ is among the closest ¬se (i,m)-worlds to w.
Clearly, the Symmetry-relative-to-steps principle does not succumb to the same
type of objection as the Symmetry principle: a world in which all but the last step
of a line of inquiry has been successfully executed is not even among the ‘not-
the-first-step-successfully-executed’-worlds that are closest to a world in which all
steps of the line of inquiry have been successfully executed, whereas it would plau-
sibly be among the ‘not-successfully-pursued’-worlds that are closest to the latter
world. Furthermore, the right disjunct of (6) in combination with the Symmetry-
relative-to-steps principle entails φ, thus restoring factivity. I leave the details of
the argument to the reader.
The solution proposed to the problem respects the spirit of Schlöder’s account
of knowability. It guarantees factivity. It relies on the symmetry-relative-to-steps
principle. The latter is not vulnerable to the objection raised at the beginning of
this section. Further refinements are possible. For instance, it is not necessary to
work with a picture of all lines of inquiry being step-by-step procedures. But for
those lines of inquiry that are step-by-step procedures and, therefore, are vulnerable
to the kind of objection we started with, the solution outlined above seems to be
promising. However, I won’t be pushing this forward. Instead I want to focus on
a problem for Schlöder’s version of the antirealist thesis. In Section 4 I will lay
the formal groundwork for the problem in the form of a theorem and in Section 5
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I will put forward counterexamples to ART’ that are based on the aforementioned
theorem.
4 The overgeneration of knowledge: formal result
The attentive reader has probably noticed that I have not discussed Schlöder’s anal-
ysis of Fitch sentences yet. What if φ in ART or ART’ is a Fitch sentence, i.e. a
sentence of the form q∧¬Kq? It is claimed that it is consistent to claim that a Fitch
sentence is knowable. According to Schlöder (2019, Section 2.2), in the following
scenario a Fitch sentence is knowable:4
(Comet). Suppose there is a scientific experiment that can be performed exactly
once, and failure to perform it results in that some knowledge remains un-
known forever. To give a specific case, suppose there is a comet that is disin-
tegrating, and we have precisely one shot at landing a probe on it to analyse
its composition before it is gone. There is a chance of critical failure (say,
the probe breaks on landing), which results in us never being able to analyse
the comet (there is no time to send another probe before it disintegrates).
The analysis provided by Schlöder (2019, Section 2.3) is the following:
As in (Comet), the knowability of a Fitch proposition q∧¬Kq can
be witnessed by a course of inquiry i that imparts the knowledge that q
without changing the truth value of q, plus the background knowledge
that pursuing i is the only way to know q.
Here q describes the comet’s composition and line of inquiry i consists in the probe
landing on the comet, analysing its composition, and sending back the data.
Let us spell out Schlöder’s analysis in a little bit more detail. Given that the
course of inquiry i has imparted knowledge that q, the first condition is the follow-
ing:5
sp (i) K (¬sp (i) q) . (7)
Assuming that ‘the background knowledge that pursuing i is the only way to know
q’ applies to those closest worlds where i has been successfully pursued, the second
condition is the following:
sp (i) K (¬sp (i) ¬Kq) . (8)
With the two conditions rendered formally, we are ready to prove some results, but
first I will give an overview of what is to follow in this section.
First, it will turn out that (8) is a necessary condition for counterfactual knowl-
edge of q∧¬Kq (Lemma 1). To repeat, the truth of (8) is based on ‘the background
4This example is based on (Edgington, 1985, p. 565).
5I am assuming here that it is meant that the ‘without changing the truth value of q’ bit is within
the scope of the knowledge that has been imparted by the course of inquiry i.
12
knowledge that pursuing i is the only way to know q’, so line of inquiry i is a ‘one
shot’. However, in some cases, even in some very mundane cases, there is more
than one line of inquiry that could have been successfully pursued to discover that
q. Let’s say that there is an alternative line of inquiry j. Furthermore, suppose
that the following two conditions are met. If line of inquiry i were successfully
pursued, it would remain the case that, if another line of inquiry, j, had been suc-
cessfully pursued, then q would also be known. Moreover, if line of inquiry i were
successfully pursued, it would be a close possibility that line of inquiry i wouldn’t
be successfully pursued but that line of inquiry j would be successfully pursued.
Under those conditions, (8) is false (Lemma 2). It turns out that one can also derive
the falsity of (8) under two other conditions, one of which is stronger and one of
which is weaker. So, if there is an alternative line of inquiry j and some condi-
tions are met than there is no counterfactual knowledge of q∧¬Kq. Combined
with the famous Church-Fitch lemma (Lemma 4), this leads then to the unknowa-
bility of q∧¬Kq (negation of the right-hand side of ART’) and, hence, the falsity
of q∧¬Kq (negation of the left-hand side of ART’). It is this result (Theorem 1)
that will be used in Section 5 and that leads to the overgeneration of knowledge
in certain cases, in which next to a line of inquiry i there is an alternative line of
inquiry j meeting the above conditions.
The first lemma says that (7) and (8) are jointly sufficient and individually
necessary conditions for a conjunct of the right disjunct of the right-hand side of
ART’.
Lemma 1. The conjunction of (7) and (8) is logically equivalent to:
sp (i) K (¬sp (i) (q∧¬Kq)) . (9)
Proof. This follows from the following theorems. First, there are the following
two theorems from the logic of counterfactuals:
(φ ψ)∧ (φ θ) |= φ (ψ∧ θ) ; (10)
φ (ψ∧ θ) |= (φ ψ)∧ (φ θ) . (11)
Second, there is the following theorem of counterfactual logic:
If ψ |= θ, then φ ψ |= φ θ. (12)
Third, there are the following two theorems from the logic of knowledge:
K (φ∧ψ) |= Kφ∧Kψ; (13)
Kφ∧Kψ |= K (φ∧ψ) . (14)
 
What Lemma 1 makes clear is that the condition (8), namely the counterfactual
knowledge that pursuing i is the only way to know q, is a necessary condition for
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the counterfactual knowledge of q∧¬Kq (the right disjunct of the right-hand side
of ART’). But more often than not, the former condition will fail. There are quite
realistic circumstances under which these conditions hold. In fact, there are two
pairs of conditions under which it is false at a world that sp (i)K (¬sp (i) ¬Kq).
Lemma 2. Suppose that there is at least one sp (i)-world and that the following
two counterfactuals are true at a world w, for some course of inquiry j:
sp (i) (sp ( j) Kq) ; (15)
sp (i) ¬ (¬sp (i) ¬sp ( j)) . (16)
Then it is false at w that (8).
Proof. Suppose that there is at least one sp (i)-world and that (15)-(16) are true
at a world w. Let’s say that w′ is among the closest-to-w sp (i)-worlds. By the
first enumerated assumption, it follows that sp ( j) Kq is true at w′. By the sec-
ond enumerated assumption, it follows that among the closest-to-w′ ¬sp (i)-worlds
there is at least one sp ( j)-world. The combination of these two intermediary con-
clusions entails that among the closest-to-w′ ¬sp (i)-worlds there is at least one
Kq-world. Consequently, it is false at w′ that ¬sp (i) ¬Kq and, therefore, it
is also false at w′ that K (¬sp (i) ¬Kq). Since w′ is among the closest-to-w
sp (i)-worlds, it is false at w that sp (i) K (¬sp (i) ¬Kq) .  
Lemma 3. Suppose that there is at least one sp (i)-world and that the following
two counterfactuals are true at a world w, for some course of inquiry j:
sp (i) K (sp ( j) Kq) (17)
sp (i) ¬K (¬sp (i) ¬sp ( j)) (18)
Then it is false at w that (8).
Proof. Suppose that there is at least one sp (i)-world and that (17)-(18) are true
at a world w. Let’s say that w′ is among the closest-to-w sp (i)-worlds. By the
first enumerated assumption, it follows that K (sp ( j) Kq) is true at w′. By the
second enumerated assumption, it follows that ¬K (¬sp (i) ¬sp ( j)) is true at
w′. Consequently, there is at least one world w′′ such that w′′ is epistemically
accessible from w′ and ¬sp (i) ¬sp ( j) is false at w′′. Therefore, there is among
the closest-to-w′′ ¬sp (i)-worlds at least one sp ( j)-world, w′′′. Given that w′′ is
epistemically accessible from w′, it follows that sp ( j) Kq is true at w′′. Hence,
w′′′ is a Kq-world. But then ¬sp (i) ¬Kq is false at w′′ and, consequently,
K (¬sp (i) ¬Kq) is false at w′. This implies that sp (i) K (¬sp (i) ¬Kq)
is false at w.  
Condition (15) in Lemma 2 is weaker than than condition (17) in Lemma 3,
because the antecedent is in both cases the same but the consequent is weaker in
the first case. But condition (16) in Lemma 2 is stronger than than condition (18)
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in Lemma 3, because the antecedent is in both cases the same but the consequent
is stronger in the first case. Note that the condition that there is at least one sp (i)-
world may be implicit in the fact that i ∈ Inq or, in other words, that i is a possible
course of inquiry. But I have opted for making it explicit.
Lemma 4 (Church-Fitch). It is logically true that ¬K (q∧¬Kq).
Theorem 1. Assume that ART’ with φ = q∧¬Kq is true at a world w, and that, for
every i ∈ Inq for which ¬sp (i) is true at w, there is at least one sp (i)-world and,
for some course of inquiry j, (15)-(16) or (17)-(18) are true at world w. Then it is
false at w that q∧¬Kq or, in other words, it is true at w that q→ Kq.
Proof. Suppose that, for every i ∈ Inq for which ¬sp (i) is true at w, there is at least
one sp (i)-world and that (15)-(16) or (17)-(18) are true at world w as well. By
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, it follows that (8) is false at w. By Lemma 1, it follows
that (9) is false at w. Since (9) is one of the conjuncts of
¬sp (i)∧¬K (¬sp (i)→ φ)∧ (sp (i) K (¬sp (i) φ)) ,
it follows that the right disjunct of the right-hand side of ART’ is false at w. More-
over, by Lemma 4, it follows that K (q∧¬Kq) is false at w. So, the left disjunct
of the right-hand side of ART’ is also false at w. Therefore, the right-hand-side
of ART’ is false at w, because both of its disjunctions are false at w. Assuming
the truth of ART’, it follows that the left-hand-side of ART’ is also false at w. In
other words, it is false at w that q∧¬Kq or, in other words, it is true at w that
q→ Kq.  
The above theorem comes with conditions. In the next section I will present
counterexamples to ART’ that are based on the above theorem.
5 The overgeneration of knowledge: cases
My main claim is the following. There are cases in which it is true that, for every
possible line of inquiry that has been unsuccessfully pursued at a world, there is
a possible world at which that line of inquiry has been successfully pursued and
there is another line of inquiry for which conditions (15)-(16) or (17)-(18) are true
at that world. Assuming ART’ with φ = q∧¬Kq and given Theorem 1, it follows
that it is false that q is true but unknown or, in other words, it is true that, if q is true,
then it is known. But in those cases it is true that q is true but unknown or, in other
words, q is unknown despite being true. In other words, we obtain overgeneration
of knowledge. Therefore, ART’ is not in general true.
I will present two cases. The first case is quite literally a garden-variety case.
Strawberries My wife and I want to know whether there still are any ripe straw-
berries in the garden. We are coordinating between the two of us who will
go and check. The other person is going to check whether we still have ice
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cream in the fridge. It is a close call but it is decided that I will go and check
whether there are ripe strawberries in the garden. But then we receive a
phone call with an invitation for a BBQ at a friend’s place. We leave without
checking whether there still are strawberries in the garden and whether there
still is ice cream in the fridge. If the phone call had been made five minutes
later, I would have discovered that there were indeed still a few ripe straw-
berries in the garden. But I would not have known that, if I had not come
and checked, then the presence of strawberries in the garden would not have
been known. For, if my wife had gone and checked, she would have come
to know the same fact, and it is a live possibility that not I but she would
have gone and checked. Or, I know that, if my wife had gone and checked,
she would have come to know that there are ripe strawberries in the garden,
and I don’t know that, if I had not gone and checked, my wife wouldn’t have
gone and checked either. (This holds mutatis mutandis when our roles had
been reversed.)
In the above scenario line of inquiry i consists of me going into the garden
to check, while line of inquiry j consists of my wife going into the garden and
check. They are the only relevant lines of inquiries in the sense that, if they were
successfully pursued, it would be known that, if they hadn’t, then q (namely, that
there are ripe strawberries in the garden) would (still) be true — see (7). Conditions
(15)-(16) are in this scenario the following: if my wife had gone and checked,
she would have come to know the same fact, and it is a live possibility that she
would have gone and checked if I hadn’t. Conditions (17)-(18) are in this case the
following: I know that, if my wife had gone and checked, she would have come to
know that there are ripe strawberries in the garden, and I don’t know that, if I had
not gone and checked, my wife wouldn’t have gone and checked either. Given that
both (15)-(16) and (17)-(18) are true in this hypothetical scenario and that lines of
inquiries i and j are the only relevant ones, the right-hand side of ART’ is false
for the Fitch sentence ‘there are still ripe strawberries in our garden but it is not
known that it is the case’. It then follows that the left-hand side of ART’ is false
for that same Fitch sentence. So, given the hypothetical truth that there are still
ripe strawberries in our garden, it is known that there are still ripe strawberries in
our garden. But nobody has visited our garden since we left. Hence, it is very
reasonable to claim that it is unknown that there are still ripe strawberries in our
garden.
The second case is a case of historical science fiction. Its main difference is
that the alternative lines of inquiries are now not individuated based on people who
know each other (husband and wife), their spatiotemporal locations (home and
garden) and their ability to perceive objects (normal eyesight), but by groups who
don’t know each other, their spatiotemporal locations and the detection technolo-
gies at their disposal. The relevance of this difference will become apparent in the
next section.
Iceberg Suppose that two countries, A and B, in the twentieth century have each
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developed technology with military use. Country A has developed sonar, a
detection system using acoustic waves, and country B has developed radar,
a detection system using radio waves. These technologies are kept secret
and no other country has them. Country A has outfitted a submarine with
sonar and country B has outfitted a ship with radar. Both the submarine
and the ship are patrolling in the Arctic Ocean. Neither crew knows about
the other vessel. There is an iceberg at a certain spot in the Arctic Ocean.
The submarine is a bit to the southwest of the iceberg and the ship is a bit
to the southeast of the iceberg. If the submarine had went northeast a bit,
it would have detected the presence of the iceberg using sonar. If the ship
had gone northwest a bit, it would have detected the iceberg using radar. As
it happens, they each independently set a different course and they do not
detect the presence of the iceberg. If the submarine had gone northeast, it
would not have been the case that, had it not gone north east, it would not
have been known that there is an iceberg at that spot. For, if the ship had
gone northeast, it would also have been known that there is an iceberg at that
spot, and it is a live possibility that not the submarine but the ship had picked
an iceberg detecting course. (This holds mutatis mutandis when the ship had
gone northeast.)
Following Schlöder’s account of knowability, the Fitch sentence ‘there is an iceberg
at that spot in the Arctic Ocean but it is not known that there is one’ is unknowable
in the sense that the right-hand side of ART’ is false. In combination with ART’
this implies then that it is known that there is an iceberg at that spot in the Arctic
Ocean if that is indeed the case. Yet, nobody has detected it. So, it is again very
plausible to claim that it is unknown that there is an iceberg at that spot in the Arctic
Ocean.
Note that in the case of Iceberg the conditions (15)-(16) mentioned in Lemma 2
are satisfied, but not the conditions (17)-(18) mentioned in Lemma 3. The sub-
marine crew are unaware and unsuspecting of the ship and its secret detection
technology, so in those cases they don’t have any de re knowledge about them.
Consequently, the submarine crew does not know that, if the ship had set course to
the northwest and used its radar, it would be known that there is an iceberg at that
spot in the Arctic Ocean. More formally, if there is no de re knowledge about line
of inquiry j, then there is also no de re knowledge of the form K (sp ( j) Kq),
whereas it it is true that ¬K (¬sp (i) ¬sp ( j)). So, if there is counterfactual de
re ignorance about j, as in the case of the closest sp (i)-worlds, then condition
(17) is false, even though the condition (18) is true. Generally speaking, positive
epistemic (sub)formulas with a free variable ranging over lines of inquiry are not
satisfied relative to assignments to that free variable about which there is de re igno-
rance, however, it does not imply that negative epistemic (sub)formulas with a free
variable ranging over lines of inquiry are not satisfied relative to those assignments
to that free variable. Note that the problem of counterfactual de re ignorance does
not affect conditions (15)-(16), because they don’t contain a free variable ranging
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over lines of inquiries within the scope of the knowledge operator.
The overgeneration of knowledge resulting from ART’ is not as extreme as in
the case of the conclusion of the Church-Fitch paradox. In the latter the thesis that
all truths are knowable entails that all truths are known. This implies maximum
overgeneration of knowledge: all truths are supposed to be known, despite of the
fact that most of them are not known. In contrast, ART and ART’ imply a limited
overgeneration of knowledge: some truths are supposed to be known, despite the
fact that they are not in fact known. But irrespective of the extent of the overgener-
ation of knowledge, we do get overgeneration of knowledge from ART’.
In the next section the logical structure of lines of inquiries will be discussed
and it will be examined whether the logical structure of lines of inquiries can be
exploited to save Schlöder’s knowability thesis from the problem of the overgenera-
tion of knowledge. The problem of counterfactual de re ignorance about alternative
lines of inquiry will reappear.
6 The logical structure of lines of inquiries and the prob-
lem of de re counterfactual ignorance
In response to the problem of the overgeneration of knowledge, one might propose
to include the ‘disjunction’ of two lines of inquiry into the set of lines of inquiry.6
In the case of Strawberries there is then supposed to be a line of inquiry that consists
of me or my wife going to the garden to check. In the case of Iceberg there is then
supposed to be a line of inquiry that consists of the submarine going northeast and
using sonar or the ship going northwest and using radar. Let’s say that we are
allowing ‘disjunctive’ lines of inquiry:
∃k (k ∈ Inq∧ k = dis (i, j)) .
If anything is an analytic truth about disjunctive lines of inquiries, then surely
the following are:
sp (i)→ sp (dis (i, j)) ; (19)
sp ( j)→ sp (dis (i, j)) . (20)
Therefore, the following are also analytic truths:
¬sp (dis (i, j))→¬sp (i) ; (21)
¬sp (dis (i, j))→¬sp ( j) . (22)
The analyticity can be used to argue against the following variations on condi-
6Julian J. Schlöder suggested an ‘algebra of lines of inquiry’ during discussion of his work in
Leuven on 22 February 2019.
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tion (16), with i replaced by dis (i, j):
sp (dis (i, j)) ¬ (¬sp (dis (i, j)) ¬sp (i)) ; (23)
sp (dis (i, j)) ¬ (¬sp (dis (i, j)) ¬sp ( j)) . (24)
sp (dis (i, j)) ¬ (¬sp (dis (i, j)) ¬sp (dis (i, j))) . (25)
Let us assume (23)-(25) for a reductio. The argument proceeds as follows. First,
apply necessitation to (21), (22), and the logical truth¬sp (dis (i, j))→¬sp (dis (i, j))
to put a first box operator in front of the material implications. Next, use modal
axiom scheme 4 to put a second box operator in front of the first modal operator.
Subsequently, use (1), necessitation to (1) and modal axiom scheme K to derive
the following:
 (¬sp (dis (i, j)) ¬sp (i)) ; (26)
 (¬sp (dis (i, j)) ¬sp ( j)) . (27)
 (¬sp (dis (i, j)) ¬sp (dis (i, j))) . (28)
Then use
(φ ψ)→ (^φ→ ^ψ) ,
which is also valid in the Lewis-style semantics for counterfactuals, to derive from
(23)-(25) that, if ^sp (dis j (i, j)), then (26)-(28) are false. Next, use contraposition
to conclude that ¬^sp (dis j (i, j)). Finally, recall that it was assumed throughout
that ^sp (i) and ^sp ( j), from which it follows in any normal modal logic by the
necessitation of (19) and (20) that^sp (dis j (i, j)). We have derived a contradiction.
Thus, relative to the disjunctive line of inquiry, there is no alternative line of
inquiry for which all the conditions of Lemma 2, in particular condition (16), are
met. A broadly similar argument can be lodged against the variations on condition
(18), with i replaced by dis (i, j). The only relevant difference is that it has to be
assumed that as analytic truths they are not just necessarily true but also necessarily
known. I leave it to the reader to fill in the details. Thus, relative to the disjunctive
line of inquiry, there is no alternative line of inquiry for which all the conditions
of Lemma 3 are met. The introduction of ‘disjunctive lines of inquiry’ promises to
undermine the problem of the overgeneration of knowledge.
However, it is not because the earlier conditions for the lack of counterfactual
knowledge are not satisfied relative to the disjunctive line of inquiry that there is
indeed counterfactual knowledge relative to the line of inquiry. I will now argue
that condition (9), with i replaced by dis (i, j), is not in all cases satisfied:
sp (dis (i, j)) K (¬sp (dis (i, j)) (q∧¬Kq)) (29)
Note that the variables i, j, which range over lines of inquiries, are occurring freely
within a positive epistemic subformula, namely
K (¬sp (dis (i, j)) (q∧¬Kq)) .
19
Consequently, for this positive epistemic subformula to be satisfied there has to be
de re knowledge about i and j. Let us return now to the Iceberg case. No agent in
this case has de re knowledge of both lines of inquiry i and j, because the agents
on the submarine don’t know about the ship, its spatiotemporal location and its
secret detection technology, and the mutatis mutandis for the agents on the ship.
Now among the closest worlds in which the disjunctive line of inquiry has been
successfully pursued there will be worlds in which only one of the constituting lines
of inquiries has been successfully pursued. There is no detection of the other vessel
and its location, because the other vessel could have gone, say, south. So, among
the closest worlds in which the disjunctive line of inquiry is successfully pursued,
there remains de re ignorance about one of the constituting lines of inquiry.7 The
problem of the overgeneration of knowledge is not solved by appeal to disjunctive
lines of inquiries because of the problem of counterfactual de re ignorance about
alternative lines of inquiry.
7 Conclusions
Defenders of the antirealist thesis that all truths are knowable faced a tough hurdle
in the form of the Church-Fitch paradox of knowability: if the antirealist thesis is
accepted, then all truths are known. The paradox features a particular concept of
knowability, namely possible knowledge. That concept is not factive: it is pos-
sible to know a falsehood. In response, Edgington (1985) has proposed a factive
concept of knowledge, namely possible knowledge of actuality. She has used this
concept to reformulate the antirealist thesis. The Church-Fitch paradox of knowa-
bility cannot be run against Edgington’s version of the antirealist thesis. However,
Williamson (1987) and Heylen (2020) have formulated several triviality objections.
At this point Schlöder (2019) enters the debate. Building on Edgington’s insights,
he introduces a new factive notion of knowability and a new version of the antire-
alist thesis. He forcefully argues that the latter can deflect the triviality objections
offered by Williamson (1987) and Heylen (2020).
In this article I have argued that both directions of Schlöder’s version of the
antirealist thesis are confronted with problems. The right-to-left direction of that
thesis says that only truths are knowable in Schlöder’s sense, whereas the left-to-
right direction of that thesis says that all truths are knowable in Schlöder’s sense.
The problem with the right-to-left direction of the thesis is that its justification
rests on an implausible principle. Yet, I have described a way to improve that
justification. The problem with the left-to-right direction of the thesis is that it
leads to attributions of knowledge where there is ignorance. This is the problem of
the overgeneration of knowledge.
7By the way, it could also have happened that both vessels go north and that they detect the
presence of each other (although that is not always the case). But even if there were a detection of
the other vessel, it is not easy to find out about the detection technology on board of the other ship.
There remains de re ignorance about the other line of inquiry.
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In Schlöder’s own conclusion he was quite willing to separate both directions
of his own version of the antirealist theory of truth. He thinks that the left-to-right
direction of the thesis, which says that all truths are knowable in Schlöder’s sense,
is false. However, he also thinks that the right-to-left direction of the thesis, which
says that only truths are knowable in Schlöder’s sense, is useful, because we need
a factive concept of knowability. He was wise to separate the two. This brings us
to the first two general conclusions.
First, the research programme initiated by Edgington (1985) seems to be “de-
generating” in the sense that its various versions of the knowability thesis continue
to run into serious theoretical problems. What is more, a pattern starts to emerge.
The Church-Fitch paradox shows that the knowability thesis, with knowability un-
derstood as the possibility to know, entails omniscience: all truths are known. Edg-
ington (1985)’s version of that thesis avoids actual omniscience, but it brings possi-
ble omniscience in: there is a possible state at which all truths are known. Schlöder
(2019)’s version of the knowability thesis entails neither omniscience nor possible
omniscience, but it still overgenerates knowledge. That is the pattern: whether it is
actual or possible, maximal or limited, each of the proposals that were mentioned
overgenerates knowledge. This seems to be the ghost of the Church-Fitch paradox
that it is hard to expel.
Second, to the extent that philosophers such as Brogaard and Salerno (2006)
and Fuhrmann (2014) are right about the claim that our intuitive concept of knowa-
bility is factive, it is indeed worth exploring factive concepts of knowability that
are made formally precise. Brogaard and Salerno (2006, p. 261) ask us to consider
the following imaginary dialogue between two colleagues, A and B:
A: We could be discovered.
B: Discovered doing what?
A: Someone might discover that we’re having an affair.
B: But we are not having an affair!
A: I didn’t say that we were.
There is something very odd about using the phrase “could be discovered” in a non-
factive way. It is to Edgington (1985)’s credit that she introduced a factive notion
of knowability that was later made precise. The factivity of Edgington’s notion of
knowability came with triviality issues. Schlöder (2019) improved on Edgington’s
notion by managing to keep factivity while dodging the triviality issues. The work
done in Section 3 is meant to be an improvement on the justification for the factivity
of Schlöder’s notion of knowability. This remains a fruitful line of research.
The third general conclusion is that we should investigate the internal and log-
ical structure of lines of inquiries more. The internal structure of lines of inquiries,
with some being step-by-step procedures, is something that played an important
role in the discussion of the factivity of Schlöder’s notion of counterfactual knowl-
edge (Section 3). The logical structure of lines of inquiry, with some being ‘dis-
junctive’, is something that played a key role in the attempt to save Schlöder’s
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knowabilitiy thesis from the problem of the overgeneration of knowledge (Sec-
tion 6). Regarding both the internal and logical structure of lines of inquiries it
should be emphasized that I have by no means developed complete theories about
these. Can we think of all lines of inquiries as finite step-by-step procedures? If
we are going to allow ‘disjunctive’ lines of inquiries, can we then also allow ‘con-
junctive’ lines of inquiries, and so on for the other logical operators and perhaps
even quantifiers? (If it turns out to be a bad idea to impose logical structure, be
it closed under logical operations or not, then that is bad news for someone who
tries to save Schlöder’s knowability thesis from the problem of the overgeneration
of knowledge.) These are interesting research questions.
References
Artemov S, Protopopescu T (2013) Discovering knowability: A semantic analysis.
Synthese 190(16):3349–3376
Brogaard B, Salerno J (2006) Knowability and a modal closure principle. American
Philosophical Quarterly 43(3):261–270
Dummett MAE (1991) The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Harvard University
Press
Edgington D (1985) The paradox of knowability. Mind 94(376):557–568
Edgington D (2010) Possible knowledge of unknown truth. Synthese 173(1):41–52
Fara M (2010) Knowability and the capacity to know. Synthese 173(1):53–73
Fischer M (2013) Some remarks on restricting the knowability principle. Synthese
190(1):63–88
Fitch FB (1963) A logical analysis of some value concepts. Journal of Symbolic
Logic 28(2):135–142
Fuhrmann A (2014) Knowability as potential knowledge. Synthese 191(7):1627–
1648
Hart WD (1979) The epistemology of abstract objects: Access and inference. Pro-
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society 53:153–165
Hart WD, McGinn C (1976) Knowledge and necessity. Journal of Philosophical
Logic 5:205–208
Heylen J (2020) Factive knowability and the problem of possible omniscience.
Philosophical Studies 177(1):65–87
Hintikka J (1962) Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca: Cornell University Press
22
Kaplan D (1989) Demonstratives. In: Almog J, Perry J, Wettstein H (eds) Themes
From Kaplan, Oxford University Press, pp 481–563
Kripke SA (1963) Semantical considerations on modal logic. Acta Philosophica
Fennica 16(1963):83–94
Kvanvig J (1995) The knowability paradox and the prospects for anti-realism. Noûs
29(4):481–500
Lewis DK (1973) Counterfactuals. Blackwell
Rabinowicz W, Segerberg K (1994) Actual truth, possible knowledge. Topoi
13(2):101–115
Schlöder JJ (2019) Counterfactual knowability revisited. Synthese pp 1–15
Spencer J (2017) Able to do the impossible. Mind 126(502):466–497
Tennant N (1997) The Taming of the True. Oxford University Press
Williamson T (1987) On the paradox of knowability. Mind 96(382):256–261
Acknowledgements I am particularly grateful to Julian J. Schlöder, who pre-
sented his work in Leuven on 22 February 2019 and with whom I could discuss
his work before and after the presentation. Part of my paper has been presented at
the XX Jornadas Rolando Chuaqui Kettlun (Santiago de Chile, 27 August 2019–30
August 2019). I am grateful to the organizers for their invitation and I would like
to thank the audience for their feedback. In addition, I would also like to thank Fe-
lipe Morales Carbonell, Lars Arthur Tump and Lorenz Demey for their feedback
on this paper. Special thanks goes to Lorenz Demey for discussion of section 3.
Last but not least, I am thankful to two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful
reviews.
23
